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Abstract 
 
A large literature examines government fiscal interactions in federations. However, the 
empirical evidence is scattered and inconclusive, especially with respect to the size of 
interactions, as well as the institutional and economic determinants underpinning them. This 
paper uses meta-regression analysis to quantify the size of these inter-jurisdictional fiscal 
interactions and to explain the heterogeneity in empirical estimates. First, we find 
significantly stronger interactions among municipalities and nations than among intermediate 
levels of government. Second, tax interactions are, in general, stronger than expenditure 
interactions, and horizontal tax interactions appear to be stronger than vertical interactions. 
Third, both tax competition and yardstick competition are supported by the data, though the 
former appears to produce stronger interactions. Fourth, capital controls, voter turnout and the 
design of decentralization all shape fiscal interactions; political competition and fiscal 
decentralization both increase horizontal tax competition and they decrease vertical tax 
competition. Finally, much of the variation between estimates can be explained by country 
heterogeneity, differences in econometric specification and estimation strategies. 
JEL-Code: H500, H730, R100. 
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1. Introduction 
An increasingly large proportion of the world’s population is governed by federations and 
decentralized states.1 One notable feature of such structures is the possibility of inter-
jurisdictional rivalry and inter-jurisdictional interactions that can potentially play a role in 
improving the efficiency of governance. Theoretical models on fiscal federalism suggest that 
political and fiscal incentives can result in fiscal interdependence, with governments competing 
with each other in taxing their constituents and offering publicly funded programs. More 
specifically, the existence of several competing territorial governments and different government 
layers paves the way for inter-government (horizontal) and intra-government (vertical) 
interactions. These are driven by factor mobility and the mechanisms of the political agency that 
can give rise to fiscal outcomes that differ substantially from monolithic government structures. 
Another stream within this literature offers various explanations for the existence and magnitude 
of strategic and spatial interactions. Whilst these  issues are intertwined, most of the theoretical 
attention has focused on the effects of federalism on welfare and efficiency. In contrast, most of 
the empirical effort has centered on the existence and extent of strategic interactions. It is this 
empirical literature that is the focus of our paper.  
The theoretical literature predicts both positive and negative effects from inter-
government interactions. Positive outcomes arise when mobility enables citizens to ‘vote with 
their feet’, sorting themselves by migrating to a rival jurisdiction. This process helps to solve the 
preference aggregation problem of allocating public goods when preferences are heterogeneous, 
insofar as it allows individuals to sort themselves into jurisdictions where the supply of public 
goods (and hence expenditures) matches their willingness to pay (Tiebout, 1956). 
Simultaneously, the Leviathan hypothesis argues that efficiency gains can arise because self-
sorting (or the threat of self-sorting) can potentially discipline governments by restricting their 
                                               
1 According to Voigt and Blume (2011), about 40% of the world’s population lives within a federal state. 
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spending and their revenue raising capacities, taming the perennial growth of the Leviathan 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). One major side effect is the potential for a “race to the bottom” 
of the key adjustment variables, most prominently tax and expenditure rates; inter-government 
competition can erode redistribution and hamper welfare state development, especially the 
provision of important public goods.2  
The existence and intensity of fiscal interactions is also contentious issues in the 
literature. Brueckner (2003) notes that the direction of the reaction to a rival government’s tax 
rate is theoretically ambiguous.  Several authors argue that strategic interactions, especially in the 
form of downward pressure on tax revenues (and/or expenditures), might not necessarily occur 
and, if they do, they need not happen in anything like the way that simple models suggest; 
intervening variables such as political incentives and institutional constraints (Besley, 2006) 
exert a taming influence (Oates, 1999; Rom, 2006; Simeon, 2006). Some governments might be 
reluctant to lower social services when they are used more than proportionally by the median 
voter, even if doing so might enhance overall welfare, because the mechanisms of the political 
agency might inhibit re-election. Some political systems might benefit from the high social 
standards demanded by median voters, especially from the higher levels of health and education, 
and the social cohesion that comes from higher standards of social citizenship.3  
The evidence on fiscal interactions becomes even more ambiguous when multi-tiered 
governments and ‘vertical’ fiscal interdependence is considered. On the revenue side, vertical tax 
externalities arise when both lower and higher level jurisdictions tax the same base. Keen and 
Kotsogiannis (2002) argue that while horizontal tax competition can lead to taxes that are too 
                                               
2 This idea was first coined almost eighty years ago by Justice Brandeis, who admonished US State governments for 
competing by decreasing their social expenditures and reducing taxation in order to attract private investment 
(Schram, 2000). A race to the bottom means a downward bias in benefits rather than necessarily a reduction in 
benefits to a bare minimum (Brueckner, 2000). 
3 Similarly, higher taxes might pay off in the long run if they enable high-skill businesses, risky start-ups, and stable, 
well-trained workforces (Hansen, 2006), while a good health system with a healthy population can be an economic 
virtue in itself (Suhrcke et al. 2005). 
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low, vertical tax competition can lead to taxes that are too high. However, the sign of the reaction 
functions is theoretically unclear, as there are several offsetting effects (Besley and Rosen, 1998; 
Wilson, 1999).  
There is also a lack of consensus on the sources of fiscal interdependence. Fiscal 
interdependence is said to emerge from geographic, social and economic linkages that result in 
spatial and informational spillovers. For example, fiscal interactions can arise from yardstick 
competition, whereby citizens compare tax rates and the quantity and quality of public programs 
in their residing jurisdiction to other jurisdictions (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Breton, 
1996). The fear of electoral punishment induces incumbent governments to compete with their 
rivals. Strategic interactions can also occur through tax competition designed to attract/retain 
business investment. It can also occur as a means of avoiding welfare magnets (discouraging 
‘undesirable’ welfare-seeking residents), or alternatively as a result of competing for ‘desirable’ 
citizens (by offering better public goods), or because of shared ideologies and trends in 
government administration.4 
Given these factors, the existence and intensity of inter-government competition, the 
factors that create this competition and its economic consequences, are all empirical questions. 
Empirical studies mainly analyze the existence and intensity of fiscal interdependence in 
different settings and institutional arrangements. This literature has blossomed since the early 
studies in the 1980s. However, the existing empirical literature is heterogeneous in its findings 
and lacks a common interpretation of the existing evidence. Indeed, the empirical literature is 
now so large and diverse that it is very difficult to digest and understand its quantitative 
implications for both further theoretical analysis and policy.  
The heterogeneity in the empirical findings and the limited consensus on the nature and 
intensity of fiscal interactions motivates our paper.  We contribute to the literature by applying 
                                               
4 Institutional design and the nature of taxation are also important dimensions. For example, generally, taxation of 
mobile resources is more likely to give rise to a race to the bottom and smaller and more homogeneous jurisdictions 
are likely to be more competitive.  
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meta-regression analysis (MRA) to the existing empirical evidence from the wealth of studies 
that test for the existence and degree of fiscal interdependence.5 The MRA uses data drawn from 
83 primary empirical studies that collectively report 1,168 estimates of strategic interactions.6 In 
addition to data drawn from the studies themselves, we also consider information external to the 
studies, such as the degree of capital controls, voter turnout and the degree of decentralization of 
the countries investigated. That is, we analyze both the heterogeneity considered within the 
primary studies themselves (through their chosen econometric model), plus the heterogeneity in 
the samples used by different studies that was not modeled by the studies. By combining the 
results of different studies, meta-analysis enables us to explore factors that were not considered 
by the primary studies. 
In this paper we take stock of the existing evidence and use MRA to answer four sets of 
questions: (1) Does the existing evidence indicate that governments engage in fiscal interactions? 
How strong are these interactions? Do governments compete more with respect to their spending 
or their revenues (taxation)?  (2) Is inter-government competition more likely to occur in 
homogenous communities (e.g. local authorities within states) than at higher levels of 
aggregation of the government unit (e.g. at the State or national level)? Do country reaction 
functions differ to local government ones? (3) What are the sources of tax and expenditure 
mimicking; welfare magnets, tax competition, or yardstick competition? and (4) What factors 
explain the generally large differences in reported results between studies? Answers to these 
questions are all very important to understanding the behavior of important federations, such as 
the U.S. They are also particularly important for European countries, given the processes of fiscal 
and political decentralization, alongside the increased interactions among EU member states due 
to processes of regional integration in different sectors.  
                                               
5 As already noted, the empirical literature on the consequences of such interactions is still relatively infant. 
6 An appendix is available that details the studies used and the estimates chosen from each study. The full set of data 
are available from the authors to enable replication and extension of our study. 
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Our primary objective in this paper is the systematic review of the empirical evidence, 
with a thorough statistical analysis of the existing estimates. While the theoretical considerations 
have been explored extensively elsewhere (Besley, 2006; Bruekner, 2003), a digest of the 
empirical literature is currently missing. The focus of the paper is purely on dissecting the 
empirical literature and drawing inferences from it. The paper is divided into four sections. 
Section 2 describes the selection of studies and data used, while section 3 outlines the meta-
regression methodology. The MRA results are reported and interpreted in section 4. The paper is 
concluded in section 5. 
 
2. The Meta-Data: background, description and specification 
2.1 Specification and estimation issues 
Measuring and identifying strategic interactions between governments is not a simple 
task. The earlier empirical literature focused on welfare migration caused by competition for 
mobile resources. Our focus is on the subsequent, and much larger, literature that has specifically 
accounted for neighborhood effects between local governments by estimating fiscal reaction 
functions.7 The econometric models used for estimation must account for strategic interactions 
between local governments (and/or between local and higher level governments). Fiscal 
interactions  are typically modeled as reaction functions of the ith jurisdiction’s fiscal choices 
( Fit , benefits or taxation) in year t, depending on the choices of the jth neighboring  jurisdiction 
at time t, plus other variables that also explain domestic expenditure or taxation. This can be 
expressed as: 
                                               
7 Brueckner (2000:514-519) provides a survey of the empirical studies on welfare migration. This literature has 
produced many conflicting results. We focus on the more direct tests of the theory by analyzing whether policy 
makers affect their tax and welfare levels, rather than whether there is welfare migration. 
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where 3210 ,,,   are parameters to be estimated, F jt  refers to the fiscal choices of the j 
neighboring jurisdiction at time t (horizontal competition) and vtF  refers to the fiscal choices of 
the v higher level governments at time t (vertical competition).8 The vector of controls itX  refers 
to the characteristics of one’s jurisdiction, including size, political and demographic 
characteristics, and the type of jurisdiction.9 The reaction functions are specified with spatial 
econometric adjustments when spatial weights ( jt ) are introduced to account for the existence 
of different neighbors ( jtjt F ). Controls are required for the endogeneity the neighbor’s 
reactions, as well as different forms of unobserved heterogeneity when running empirical 
analysis of such phenomena. 
The heterogeneity of empirical approaches arises partly from specification differences 
and partly from the difficulty of determining what weight to assign to neighboring jurisdictions 
and the relevant level of ‘neighborliness’. Most specifications (Case 1993 and Case, Rosen and 
Hines 1999, among others) weigh geographical contiguity positively in the matrix, with studies 
varying according to the weights that they attribute to all the geographical neighbors.10  
A further important question involves adopting the most efficient econometric 
specification. The main concern with this type of specification is the simultaneity problem 
created by the strategic interaction of competing governments. This type of “spatial lag” 
(Saavedra, 2000:13) creates an omitted variable bias under OLS estimation, resulting in biased 
                                               
8 Fixed region and time effects can also be included. 
9 Earlier models did not include the vertical competition term, while some newer studies exclude horizontal 
competition. Some studies lag some of these variables to account for the delays in the ability of voters to observe 
some of these variables in real time. The vector X can include also characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions. 
10 However other approaches are also used. Most interestingly, Edmark (2007) adds measures of neighborliness 
based on cross state news media influences, and alternatively weighting by migration patterns. This measure is also 
present in Figlio, Kolpin and Reid (1999:439). 
 8
and inconsistent results (Edmark, 2007:14; and Kaleijan and Prucha, 1998: 99). The relevant 
literature deals with this hurdle in different ways. The first approach is to use the Maximum 
Likelihood estimator. This method is said to guarantee consistency and efficiency of the 
estimates (Saavedra, 2000:12). However, it is also a restrictive method requiring the assumption 
that the neighborhood matrix is small and that its estimated coefficient cannot exceed unity. 
These restrictive assumptions, as well as identification problems (Saavedra, 2000: 14) and the 
mathematical complexities associated with this method (Kaleijan and Prucha, 1998:99) explain 
why many studies prefer to avoid this method. Alternatively, many of the studies included in our 
dataset use IV to overcome this problem.  Some of these studies elaborate on the IV approach 
through the insights of Kaleijan and Prucha (1998, 1999 and 2004). These authors “introduce a 
series-type instrumental variable (IV) estimator of the parameters of a spatial first order 
autoregressive model with first order autoregressive disturbances” (Kaleijan and Prucha 
2004:266). They argue and demonstrate that their method is computationally simple, distribution 
free and capable of obtaining equally consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates.11 Finally, 
a smaller number of studies use Generalized Method of Moments. 
 
2.2 Study selection and data construction 
A comprehensive search was carried out to identify all econometric studies reporting estimates of 
inter-government tax and welfare competition.12 Numerous keywords were used for the search 
process, as well as numerous search engines. We also checked carefully all references cited 
within empirical, theoretical, and review studies. Both published (books and journal papers) and 
unpublished studies (working papers, conference papers and dissertations) were searched. We 
searched for all studies published in either English or French. The search was terminated in June 
                                               
11 While the IV estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, it is less efficient than maximum 
likelihood estimator (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). 
12 As noted earlier, our interest lies on direct estimates of the effects of inter-government competition. Hence, we 
exclude studies whose primary focus is welfare migration.  
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2010.13 This search process produced the four sets of studies listed in Table 1, being horizontal 
tax competition, horizontal benefits competition, vertical tax competition, and vertical benefits 
competition, respectively.14 Table 2 reports the country composition of the studies. The studies 
are listed in Appendix A.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Studies differ in the way in which the dependent and explanatory variables are measured. 
For example, some studies measure tax competition using tax rates, others use the log of the tax 
rate, while others use the dollar amount of tax revenue raised. On top of this, there are also 
differences in the scale of measurement used. Hence, the regression coefficients are not directly 
comparable across all studies (and estimates) included in the dataset (see Becker and Wu, 2007). 
Instead of using regression coefficients, we converted study results into partial correlations.15 
Note that our focus in this paper is purely on the direct effect of the neighboring governments’ 
choice variable. Hence, we abstract from the various spatial impacts (LeSage and Fischer, 2007). 
Partial correlations measure the correlation between taxes charged (or benefits offered) 
between rival jurisdictions, controlling for the effects of variables that are unrelated to strategic 
interactions. They are a unit-less measure of the strength and direction of jurisdictional 
interaction. The higher the partial correlation, the stronger is strategic interaction. Partial 
                                               
13 Some studies were excluded either because they were not comparable with the other 83 studies, or because they 
did not provide sufficient information from which we could calculate partial correlations (see section 3). 
14 Due to the small number of studies and estimates, we ignore vertical benefits competition in the rest of this paper. 
15 To ensure accuracy, all authors were involved with the coding and cross-checking. No research assistants were 
employed. See Doucouliagos (1995) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) for examples of the use of partial correlations 
for meta-analysis in economics. 
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correlations enable analysis of the maximum number of comparable estimates of spatial 
interaction (1,168 estimates in total).16  
The partial correlations for horizontal tax competition, welfare competition and vertical tax 
competition are illustrated in figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively, in the form of funnel plots.  Funnel 
plots trace the association between partial correlations and their associated precision, measured 
here as the inverse of the associated standard error (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010).  Funnel 
plots are a useful way to illustrate the distribution of the reported results of an empirical 
literature.  
The funnel plots reveal that while the preponderance of estimates show positive strategic 
interactions, there is a fairly wide range of results reported in the literature.  Hence, it is 
important to explain this wide variation (heterogeneity), and we use MRA to do this in section 4 
below.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3 The MRA Methodology 
The aim of the MRA is to combine all comparable estimates from different studies and to 
draw inferences from these with respect to:  (a) the existence of horizontal and vertical strategic 
interactions; (b) the size of the interactions; (c) the factors that explain the wide variation in 
                                               
16 As a second measure of effect, we compiled 450 comparable estimates of spatial lags of horizontal tax rate 
competition and 138 spatial lags of vertical tax competition, respectively. A third measure is 184 elasticities of own 
benefits (taxes) with respect to neighbors’.Wherever possible, we calculated elastiticities using information provided 
in descriptive statistics. In some cases, the scale of the measures used was unclear even though descriptive statistics 
were available. Since we are interested in drawing inferences from the largest possible datasets, we focus in this 
paper only on the partial correlations as this gives us 1,168 estimates. 
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reported estimates; and (d) identify the sources of tax and spending mimicking, specifically 
whether tax competition or yardstick competition receives the greatest empirical support.  
The MRA model involves regressing comparable measures of an effect (in our case 
partial correlations) against a constant and a set of variables that can explain the heterogeneity in 
estimates, such as data, specification and estimation differences in research design: 
  
   ijjkk0ij vZr           (j=1, 2, …L)               (2) 
 
Where rij are the partial correlations, i, from study j, such as  estimates of 1 for horizontal 
competition or 2 for vertical competition from Eq. (1), vij is the random error term and Zjk are 
moderator variables used to explain the large within and between study heterogeneity routinely 
found in economics research (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989).  Hence, the MRA of Eq. (2) involves 
regressing comparable estimates of inter-governmental competition, which we have collected 
from the 83 studies, upon a constant, and a set of variables that describe features of the studies.  
Eq. (2) allows estimates to vary as a result of sampling error (the vij term) and a set of variables 
used to capture features of the data used and the way in which the studies were conducted. 
Examples of the application of MRA in economics include studies by Görg and Strobl (2001), 
Roberts and Stanley (2005), Mookerjee (2006) and Disdier and Head (2008). 
Heterogeneity may arise from genuine empirical differences in the underlying government 
reaction functions, or it can arise from misspecification of the econometric model. In section 4 
below we use the MRA model in Eq. (2) to help us to quantify both the effects of 
misspecification and genuine differences in strategic interactions.  
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Four econometric issues need to be addressed when estimating the MRA model, Eq. (2).  
 
3.1. Data comparability 
Our search criteria were broad: We included all estimates of tax and welfare competition 
in published and unpublished studies. The published studies themselves have appeared in 
different journals. This raises the issue of whether the studies and their estimates (our data) are 
comparable. We use the MRA to quantify the effects of specification, measurement and data 
differences between studies in section 4 below. Here, we examine whether the studies differ so 
fundamentally that they cannot be combined in the MRA.  
Our data pass two tests of comparability. First, we explored whether study results differ 
according to the quality of the journal in which they were reported. To do this, we use the 2009 
Social Science Citation Index Journal Impact Factors. Any study that does not appear in this 
index is assigned a zero, as are all unpublished studies. Regressing the partial correlation against 
a constant and the Journal Impact Factors gives a coefficient of 0.02, with a t-statistic of 0.76. 
This indicates that partial correlations do not vary according to the journal quality. We also 
regressed the precision of the estimated partial correlations against the same Impact Factors. The 
associated coefficient is -1.91, with a t-statistic of -0.89. We find that the precision with which 
estimates are reported does not vary according to journal Impact Factors.17 We also explored 
whether there were differences between published and unpublished studies; differences were 
detected for neither the average partial correlation value nor their precision of the coefficients. 
Given these results, we can safely conclude that the estimates included in our dataset do not vary 
by publication status or by journal quality. We do show, however, in section 4 that the estimates 
vary as a result of measurement, data, specification, and estimator differences. 
 
                                               
17 Impact Factors can change over time. We are assuming that the 2009 Impact Factors are representative of the 
relative quality ranking of the journals over time. 
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3.2 Data dependence 
Many studies report more than one estimate. Indeed, studies report, on average, 14 estimates. 
Estimates reported within a single study might not be statistically independent of each other, 
violating one of the OLS assumptions. A number of proposals have been made in the literature 
for handling this problem, with the most common approaches being to either use Clustered Data 
Analysis or a linear hierarchical model (typically estimated using Restricted Maximum 
Likelihood, or REML). The random effects introduced by REML may not be independent of the 
underlying heterogeneity in the meta-data. If this is the case, then random effects estimates will 
be biased (see Stanley, 2008). Accordingly, our approach here is to use Clustered Data Analysis. 
We use two different clusters. First, we use each of the 83 studies as a distinct cluster (estimates 
are assumed to be clustered within studies). Second, we use author ids to cluster studies, as some 
authors have reported more than one study (estimates are assumed to be clustered around 
authors). It turns out that there is little difference in the results and, hence, we have opted to 
report results using study ids to cluster the observations and to adjust standard errors.18 
 
3.3 Selection bias  
There is now extensive evidence that selection is a widespread problem in empirical 
economics (see Roberts and Stanley, 2005 and Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2008). In many 
literatures, authors, reviewers and editors, appear to have a preference for statistically significant 
results and, in some cases, a preference for results consistent with a prevailing theory. This 
selection takes the form of an overrepresentation of statistically significant results and/or an 
underrepresentation of results that conflict with prevailing theory. The effect of this truncation in 
the reported results is to magnify and, hence, bias the overall evidence on a particular topic. This 
                                               
18 The rank correlation between the study and author ids is 0.84, rejecting the null of independence (prob-value 
is 0.00). 
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is highly problematic for both meta-analyses as well as conventional literature reviews, as it can 
severely distort statistical inference (see Roberts and Stanley 2005 for examples).  
We have reasons to believe that publication selection bias might be limited in this 
literature. Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008) argue that where theory is contested, publication 
selection will be reduced. In the case of the fiscal interactions literature, theory “allows” both 
positive and negative effects. This is particularly so if the spending under scrutiny is something 
like education, where governments might compete by increasing spending to either attract 
students or in a response to voters demands (a race to the top) or decrease spending if the 
spending is viewed as redistributive (a race to the bottom). Nevertheless, given the seriousness of 
selection bias, it is prudent to test its existence and if necessary to correct a literature from the 
effects of such bias. 
 The conventional model of publication selection in both economics and medical research 
is a simple MRA between a study’s estimated effect and its standard error (SEij).19 Eq. (2) can be 
modified to allow for this effect by estimating: 
 
ijijsejkkij uSEZr  0         (3) 
 
Estimates should not be correlated with their standard errors. Hence, if βse=0, then we conclude 
that a literature is free of selection effects. A finding that estimates are correlated with their 
standard errors (βse ≠ 0) is consistent with selection bias: Researchers search for estimates that are 
statistically significant by re-estimating models until the relationship between r and SE achieves 
                                               
19 The basic test involves running the regression: ijijseij SEr   0 . For details on this regression see Egger 
et al. (1997) and Stanley (2005, 2008).  This test for selection bias indicates the presence of selection bias with 
respect to horizontal tax competition (coefficient is 1.32 with a t-statistic of 1.92) but not for welfare competition 
(coefficient of 1.21 with a t-statistic of 1.59) and not for vertical tax competition (coefficient of 1.90 with a t-statistic 
of 1.61). Section 4 reports multivariate versions of this test based on Eq. (3). 
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some acceptable standard of statistical significance.20 In equation 3, β0 and βk are the coefficients 
corrected for selection bias (see Stanley, 2008).21 
 
3.4 Precision 
The fourth statistical issue is that estimates of strategic interactions will have different 
variances (heteroschedasticity). We use weighted least squares (WLS) to correct this 
heteroschedasticity.  The WLS version of Eq. (3) can be obtained by weighting the squared errors 
by the inverse of the estimates’ individual variances (i.e., 2/1 iSE ). The advantage of WLS in our 
context is that it assigns larger weights to those estimates that have greater precision. As can be 
seen from the funnel plots, some estimates are reported with greater precision than others. Hence, 
we do not treat all 1,168 estimates of strategic interaction equally. We do, however, explore the 
robustness of the results by treating all estimates equally and, alternatively, by using different 
weights, such as journal impact factors. 
   
3.5 Testing rival theories 
An important issue in this literature is the empirical support for the alternative theories of 
the causes of strategic interactions. Strategic interaction might be driven by welfare competition, 
tax competition, or yardstick competition. Unfortunately, these tend to be observationally 
equivalent. Our approach to this issue is twofold.First, we compare the partial correlations for 
horizontal tax and welfare competition, in order to test the relative strength of the different types 
of strategic interactions. 
                                               
20 We estimate Eq. (3) separately for horizontal tax, horizontal welfare and vertical tax competition. Most of the 
studies report estimates of only one of these interactions, so that there is relatively little dependence between 
estimates for these different types of spatial interactions. 
21 Stanley and Doucouliagos (2008) show that publication selection is analogous to sample selection biases and 
produces the conventional ‘Heckman regression’. In essence, the MRA with selection bias adjustment model 
replaces the inverse Mills ratio term with iseSE , giving rise to Eq. (3).  
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Second, we construct three variables using data that are exogenous to the studies.22 First, 
we construct the variable Capital Control. Spatial interactions that are tax driven require capital 
mobility. If capital is not mobile, then tax competition is less likely. Hence, we expect to find that 
the degree of tax competition will be influenced by the degree of capital mobility.23 In order to 
test this hypothesis, we use data from the Fraser Institute on International Capital Market 
Controls.24 
The second constructed variable is VoterTurnout. Yardstick competition theory predicts 
that voters make inter-jurisdictional comparisons as an attempt to overcome agency problems 
(Besley and Case, 1995). Hence, there should be  a positive correlation between spatial 
interactions and the degree of political competition. We considered the Polity series on political 
competition,25 however it displayed no variation for the countries included in our dataset. 
Instead, we chose to use data on voter turnout from the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance.26  
The third constructed variable is Fiscal decentralization. Spatial interactions are driven 
by decision makers with autonomy over benefits and/or taxes. Hence, we expect that spatial 
interactions will be correlated with the degree of decentralization. There are several series that 
can be used. One of the most popular series is the expenditure and revenue decentralization ratio 
reported in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. This series, however, suffers from several 
problems (for details see Stegarescu, 2005 and Boex and Simatupang, 2008). Consequently, we 
use the series on tax revenue decentralization constructed by Stegarescu (2005).27 Table 3 reports 
                                               
22 The variables are exogenous in the sense that the information used to construct the variables is not derived from 
within the studies themselves. 
23 In one sense, the important factor is whether decision makers believe that capital is mobile. However, knowledge 
of capital controls affects these perceptions. 
24 This is the series 4E, International Capital Market Controls. The maximum value of the series is 10, which denotes 
the most liberal regime, free of international capital market controls. 
25 This is the Polcomp series. 
26 Voter turnout is defined as: “The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the number of names on 
the voters' register, expressed as a percentage”. 
27 There are other series available, for example, the Fiscal Empowerment series by Boex and Simatupang (2008). 
However, these tend to overstate the degree of decentralization (Stegarescu, 2005). 
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descriptive statistics on these institutional variables for the main countries included in our 
dataset.  Note that the voter turnout for Switzerland is the lowest among the countries listed in 
Table 3. This is basically because voting is frequent in Switzerland, and generally experiences of 
direct democracy seem to mean a median voter timing of governmental action. Similarly, the 
nature of competition in Switzerland is generally larger because cantons tend to have highly 
devolved tax responsibilities.  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Both tax competition and yardstick competition can co-exist. We use the MRA results to 
infer which effect is stronger. We do this by taking advantage of heterogeneity in the samples. 
Countries differ in the degree of capital controls and voter turnout. Tax competition should 
increase as capital controls ease, while yardstick competition should increase as voter turnout 
rises. If the effects of capital controls on strategic interactions are greater (lower) than the effects 
of voter turnout, then we can conclude that tax competition (yardstick competition) is more 
prominent. Hence, by comparing the coefficients on CapitalControl and VoterTurnout variables 
in the MRA, we can test which theory draws the most empirical support. If the coefficient on 
CapitalControl is larger (smaller) than for VoterTurnout, then we can conclude that tax 
competition (yardstick competition) is more important.  
 
4. MRA Results 
4.1 Horizontal Tax Competition 
The MRA results for horizontal tax competition are presented in Table 4. Column 1 
reports sample means and standard deviations of the MRA variables. Column 2 reports the 
baseline model of nine variables that control for data differences. Studies were largely 
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heterogeneous with regards to the units of analysis. Indeed, we have collected studies that use 
data at four broad levels of government, namely municipality, county, state and the National 
level. The variables County, State and Nation are covariates that allow us to test how the level of 
government affects the magnitude of the tax competition effect, with municipality as the base. 
Arguably, the higher the level of government, the less standardized are units for citizens to run 
comparisons. Similarly, mobility is expected to decrease with the level of government, due to 
institutional and social barriers. Hence, greater competition and interactions is expected among 
lower levels of government in line with the expectation that local governments are more 
homogeneous and have less capacity to override competition.  
Differences in the measurement of the dependent variable are reflected in the four binary 
variables, Profit tax, Income tax, Property tax and Sales tax, which take the value of 1 if the 
measure of tax competition is based on profit, income, property, or sales, respectively. The 
baseline refers to total tax revenues at the municipality jurisdiction level.  
We also include Panel which is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if panel data are 
used, with cross-sectional data as the base, and AverageYear which is the average year of the 
sample used, testing whether the degree of tax competition varies over time.28 
In column 3 we add eight variables relating to estimation differences. The literature 
devotes much attention to the issue of estimating models with spatially dependent observations. 
One reason for an empirical finding of strategic interaction is the existence of some specific 
spatial heterogeneity and more specifically spatial dependence in the data, which can lead to a 
false positive. Hence, it is important that studies correct for this effect. If there are strategic 
interactions, then expenditure and taxation policies are endogenous and determined jointly by 
competing policy makers. The variable IV is included in the MRA to capture any difference in 
estimates that address  this endogeneity by instrumenting tax competition. GMM is included for 
                                               
28 AverageYear is normalised at the mean of the sample, 1991. 
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studies that use the spatial GMM estimator, while ML is included as a control for studies that use 
maximum likelihood estimation. Some studies use other estimators, such as random effects 
Tobit, and these are grouped into the single dummy variable OtherNonOLS. Where panel data 
are used, fixed and time period effects might be incorporated. The effects of these are explored 
by Fixed effects and Time effects.29 Finally, there is the issue of the weights assigned to the 
tax/benefit levels of rival jurisdictions. We combine the various alternative weights used in the 
literature into three groups. The baseline is studies that use contiguity or distance to assign 
weights to rival jurisdictions: The further away a region is, the less weight it is assigned. 
NoWeight represents studies that take a simple average of other regions. The variable 
OtherWeight represents all other weights (including income and population). 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
Country differences in strategic interactions can be explored by including several dummy 
variables to capture national differences. Column 4 includes six country dummy variables - 
Canada, France, Switzerland, UK, OECD and AllOthers - to capture national differences, with 
the USA as the base. OECD takes the value of 1 for studies that include data for the entire OECD 
rather than individual European countries. AllOthers includes estimates from countries that have 
been studied only once (Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Norway). Column 4 also considers the three (continuous) institutional variables (CapitalControl, 
VoterTurnout and FiscalDecentral, or capital market controls, voter turnout and degree of 
federalism, respectively). Since the MRA also includes these institutional variables, the country 
                                               
29 There is some collinearity amongst these variables: The first order correlation between Fixed effects and Time 
effects is 0.52, while the correlations between Panel and Fixed effects and Time effects are 0.65 and 0.52, 
respectively. 
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dummies are picking up any remaining unobservable differences between countries that might 
affect estimates of government strategic interactions.  
 Then, column 5 sees the addition of nine variables that capture differences in the 
specification of the regressions used to generate results. These variables capture the effect of 
including specific controls in the primary studies. Grants, Income, Population, Tax Base, 
Unemployment, Politics, and Verticalcomp are all binary variables that control whether the 
primary study includes grants, income, population, tax base, unemployment, the politics of the 
ruling party, and vertical competition, as control variables, respectively. Neighborlag denotes 
estimates that use a lagged measure of the neighbor’s tax, instead of a contemporaneous value.30 
Neighborchar denotes estimates that control for the characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions, 
rather than just controlling of the characteristics of the own jurisdiction. These nine variables 
capture the effect of including specific controls in the primary studies. Column 5 is the general 
model that includes all 36 variables, quantifying the effects of using different measures, samples 
and data, specifications and estimators.  
Column 6 presents our final and preferred model. This is attained through a general-to-
specific modeling strategy, sequentially removing any variable that was not statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level.31 The MRA variables that reflect data, country and 
specification differences can be taken to be capturing genuine heterogeneity in strategic 
interactions. That is, these variables quantify the extent to which strategic interactions differ 
according to the level of government, between countries, over time and according to institutional 
differences. In contrast, the estimator and specification variables help to quantify the impact of 
research design as reflected by specification and estimator differences. 
                                               
30 This is often done to get around the endogeneity between the own and neighbouring jurisdiction’s tax. 
31 The constant in Table 4 is the baseline and measures the degree of tax competition (as measured by partial 
correlations) for studies using US data on total tax charged at the municipality level, using cross-sectional data for 
1991, estimated by OLS, without any of the controls listed in the table, using distance to weigh neighbors’ tax and 
setting the three institutional data variables to zero. 
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A statistically significant positive coefficient in the MRA indicates that the variable 
increases the size of the fiscal interaction. Consistent with the hypothesis that capital is more 
mobile than labor, we find that tax interactions are smaller for less mobile factors, namely 
personal income tax (-0.07 partial correlations smaller), though the level of statistical 
significance is low. Interactions are much lower when State level data is used (-0.22) as 
compared to the municipal level, consistent with the hypothesis that lower levels of aggregation 
exhibit higher standardization. However, when larger units, namely nations are examined, other 
dimensions might drive inter-jurisdictional competition: Tax competition appears to be larger 
among nations than municipalities (0.19 higher than municipalities).32 Taken together, these 
coefficients on State and Nation suggest a non-monotonic association.  
There appears to be no time dimension in the data. Both panel and cross-sectional data 
appear to generate the same degree of spatial interaction. Cross-sectional data capture long-run 
effects while panel data captures medium-term (transition) effects. Hence, the MRA suggests that 
horizontal tax competition is the same across these different time periods. Moreover, 
AverageYear is not statistically significant, indicating no time variation in the degree of 
horizontal tax competition. 
As expected, the estimator used also matters. Controlling for region fixed effects results 
in smaller tax competition effects, pointing to the importance of unobserved effects which are 
captured when fixed effects are introduced, and the specification concentrates on the within 
variability. Interestingly, we find no significant difference between OLS and IV estimators, once 
other aspects of research design are controlled. One explanation for this result is the often 
questionable validity of the instruments used, and the extent to which inference with IV should 
be used when instruments are weak. 33 However, we find other important results: Compared to 
                                               
32 The first order correlation between Profit tax and Nation is 0.55. 
33 The relationship between OLS and IV is complicated by the existence of spatial error correlation. Normally, 
endogeneity means that the OLS coefficients will be larger than the true one, so that 2SLS  with a correct 
instrumentation strategy should result in a smaller coefficient than OLS. However, spatial error correlation provides 
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OLS, spatial GMM results in larger tax competition estimates, while maximum likelihood (ML) 
results in similar estimates to OLS, which calls for the influence of potential issues of 
endogeneity and spatial dependence which are likely to be captured in GMM unlike the ML 
estimator. The weighting scheme has no effect once other aspects of research design are 
controlled for. 
While there are no time differences, the MRA indicates important country differences. 
The level of homogeneity of a country makes units of analysis (municipalities) more 
homogeneous, and accordingly competition will tend to take place mainly in terms of prices (e.g. 
tax rates), whilst in highly heterogeneous countries there are  dimensions other than taxes that 
individuals take into account when choosing a jurisdiction. With this in mind holding other 
institutional differences constant, we find that tax competition, primarily among local 
government, is larger in more homogeneous countries such as France than it is in the US, while it 
is smaller in Switzerland, where states have a larger capacity to differentiate among themselves.  
All three institutional variables are statistically significant with a positive coefficient. As 
expected, spatial interactions increase as capital controls are relaxed, as voter turnout increases, 
and as the degree of decentralization rises. Of these, the biggest effect arises from the 
CapitalControl variable.34 Figure 4 presents the partial regression plot of the effects of capital 
controls on tax competition (holding other factors constant), while figure 5 illustrates the effects 
of fiscal decentralization.  
 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
                                                                                                                                                  
a second source of bias in OLS coefficients. Hence, the statistical insignificance of IV in table 4 is consistent with: 
(a)  the literature using correct instrumental variables (IVs) and there is no endogeneity; (b) there is endogeneity but 
the literature has not used correct IVs; and (c) the negative spatial error correlation offseting the upward bias from 
OLS. 
34 Converting the MRA coefficients into elasticities, we get 4.94 for CapitalControl, 1.61 for VoterTurnout and 0.85 
for Fiscal Decentral. That is, a 1% increase in capital control deregulation increases spatial interaction by 5%, 
whereas a 1% increase in fiscal decentralization increases spatial interactions by less than 1%. 
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Given that tax competition is only one dimension of spatial competition, other controls of 
the econometric specification are likely to be also important. The MRA indicates that controlling 
for income and population results in larger horizontal tax competition effects, while controlling 
for the tax base results in smaller effects. Taken together, the MRA variables explain about 36% 
of the variation in partial correlations, which is a reasonably large proportion for a meta-analysis. 
Finally, the statistical significance of the Standard error in columns 5 and 6 indicates that 
there is some degree of selection bias in this branch of this literature.35 Doucouliagos and Stanley 
(2008) show that if the selection bias coefficient is greater than 1, then there is significant 
selection bias. The MRA corrects the partial correlations for any distorting effects that this 
selection might create. That is, the MRA coefficients show the relationships corrected for any 
selection bias.36 
The MRA provides robust evidence of a race to the bottom in taxes such that a decrease in 
taxes in one jurisdiction leads to a decrease in taxes of neighboring jurisdictions. Using the MRA 
coefficients, we can derive the (meta-) average strategic interaction.  This varies according to the 
type of tax considered, the level of analysis and the country considered. For the USA using 
municipality data, the MRA indicates a partial correlation of +0.32, which falls to +0.10 for 
interactions among States.37  The equivalent correlations for France are +0.56 and +0.35, while 
for Switzerland these are +0.45 and +0.23.  The MRA indicates that tax competition among 
nations has a partial correlation of about +0.47, on average.  For the purpose of distinguishing 
statistical from practical significance of correlations, Cohen (1988) offers the well-known and 
                                               
35 This is consistent with the simple selection bias tests, reported in footnote 19. 
36 In separate regressions we also included in the MRA a variable for whether the study was published (Published), 
as well as the Journal Impact Factors (ImpactFactor). These were not statistically significant. For example, adding 
these variables to the MRA model reported in column 6 of Table 4 gives a coefficient of 0.01 (t-statistic = 1.14) for 
Published and -0.01 (t-statistic = -0.03) for ImpactFactor. 
37 This is calculated by using the constant in the MRA and coefficients for the three institutional variables, 
substituting their average values of the US. 
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plausible guidelines: 0.2 for a small effect, medium (0.50), and anything larger than 0.8 is a large 
effect.  By this criterion, there is a medium spatial interaction.  Hence, the partial correlations 
indicate that there are significant spatial interactions with respect to taxes. 
 
4.2 Horizontal Expenditure Competition 
Our second set of multivariate MRA relates to welfare/expenditure competition. The results 
are presented in Table 5 and follow the format of Table 4. Column 2 presents the baseline model 
that includes ten variables relating to data differences. Differences in the measurement of the 
dependent variable are reflected in five binary variables, Welfare, Education, Health, Security 
and Infrastructure, which take the value of 1 if the measure of competition is based on spending 
on welfare, education, health, security or infrastructure, respectively. The base is total 
expenditure. County, State, Nation, Panel and AverageYear, are defined as above. In column 3 
we add the eight estimator dummies. Country dummies and institutional variables are added in 
column 4,38 econometric specification differences are added in column 5, and column 6 presents 
the results of the general-to-specific modeling strategy.  
The positive coefficient on Health indicates that expenditure competition is slightly greater 
in terms of health expenditure, while the coefficient on Security indicates that it is much smaller 
with respect to security. As was the case with horizontal tax competition, the use of state level 
data results in smaller expenditure competition effects, compared to municipality data: Strategic 
interactions are weakest amongst rival states. Panel has a positive coefficient indicating that the 
medium-term (transition) effects are greater than the long-run effects (cross-sectional data). 
AverageYear is not statistically significant in the specific model, indicating that welfare 
competition is time invariant.  
                                               
38 Note that the countries included in AllOthers differs to those included in AllOthers in Table 4.  
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The use of an IV or GMM estimator results in smaller strategic interaction compared to 
OLS.  Controlling for time effects also results in smaller strategic interactions. In contrast, use of 
the maximum likelihood estimator results in larger effects, as does the inclusion of fixed region 
effects. Studies that do not use weights report larger effects. The coefficient on the NoWeight 
variable quantifies the size of the bias arising from treating all jurisdictions equally. 
Welfare interactions are much smaller in Sweden and the UK than they are in the US, due 
to its federal structure of devolved taxes. Generally, we find that relaxing capital controls and 
increasing voter turnout both increase interdependence because capital is a mobile factor and 
political participation activates the mechanisms of yardstick competition. In contrast, 
decentralization slightly reduces welfare competition.  
 Econometric specification also matters. Including grants, the politics of the party in office 
and population all result in larger interactions, while controlling for income, unemployment and 
the neighbor’s spending levels lagged, all result in smaller effects. Collectively, the MRA 
variables explain just over half of the variation in the partial correlations. 
The MRA coefficients indicate that for the US, the partial correlation for welfare competition 
interactions is 0.31 if estimation is via maximum likelihood and 0.11 if estimation is via GMM. 
In contrast, the associated estimates for Sweden are -0.09 and -0.29, respectively. 
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 4.3 Vertical Tax Competition 
The number of studies (and estimates) of vertical tax competition is much smaller than for 
horizontal competition, thereby limiting the number of potential moderator variables that can be 
included in the MRA. Some variables automatically dropped out as they were not relevant in the 
vertical tax competition MRA, even though they were relevant for horizontal tax 
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competition.Our approach was to calculate zero order correlations between the partial 
correlations and the potential moderate variables. Variables with a zero order correlation less 
than 0.20 were excluded from the MRA presented in Table 6. Subsequent tests for omitted 
variable bias confirm that these variables can be excluded from the MRA. We introduce two new 
variables, StateVertical and NationVertical, which are binary variables taking the value of 1 if 
the estimate relates to vertical interactions with state governments and national governments, 
respectively.  
The MRA results are presented in Table 6, where the base compares a municipality 
vertically competing with  a county. The type of tax does not appear to be important: Interactions 
are similar whether profit, sales, income, or total tax is involved. The negative coefficient on 
StateVertical indicates slightly weaker interaction with State governments. The coefficient on 
AverageYear again indicates no time variation in vertical strategic interactions. Estimator does 
not appear to be important, nor does the weighing scheme.39 However, the inclusion of fixed 
effects increases the size of the vertical interactions.  
Interestingly, there do not appear to be any country differences in vertical tax interactions. 
However, smaller vertical interactions are established when the analysis is conducted using 
national OECD data. That is, it appears that vertical tax competition is stronger within a nation 
than between nations. Voter turnout is again important. The negative coefficient indicates that 
political competition reduces vertical tax interactions. Interestingly, FiscalDecentral indicates 
that decentralization also reduces vertical tax interactions. That is, political competition and 
fiscal decentralization both increase horizontal tax competition and they both decrease vertical 
tax competition. Controlling for party politics produces larger effects, while controlling for tax 
base produces smaller effects (as it does for horizontal tax competition, see Table 4). The MRA 
explains 74% of the variation in partial correlations.  
                                               
39 If the GMM dummy variable is added back into the specific model (column 6), it has a coefficient of -0.066 with a 
t-statistic of -1.25. The IV variable has a coefficient of -0.0007 and a t-statistic of -0.10. Similarly, ML has a 
coefficient of -0.019 and a t-statistic of -0.30. 
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Robustness 
We explored the robustness of the MRA in several ways. First, the MRA models were re-
estimated without adjusting standard errors for data clustering. All the variables listed in the 
general-to-specific models (column 6 of Tables 4, 5 and 6) remain statistically significant. The 
one main difference is that many more MRA variables emerge to be statistically significant once 
the standard errors are not adjusted. Second, the MRA models were also re-estimated without 
using precision to weight observations. Once again, all the MRA variables from column 6 (for all 
tables) remain statistically significant, and some others also appear as statistically significant. For 
horizontal tax competition (Table 4), these are: Panel (coefficient = -0.17, t-statistic = -3.29); 
County (coefficient = -0.12, t-statistic = -2.62); Grants (coefficient = -0.05, t-statistic = -1.70); IV 
(coefficient = -0.08, t-statistic = -3.55) and ML (coefficient = -0.13, t-statistic = -3.22). While 
these estimates suggest that IV and maximum likelihood estimation does matter, we prefer the 
results presented in Table 4 because they do assign greater weight to the more precise estimates. 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper applies meta-regression analysis to the evidence on the existence and intensity 
of fiscal inter-jurisdictional interactions in both taxes and expenditures. We have drawn upon the 
findings of 83 studies that collectively report 1,168 comparable estimates of strategic interaction. 
We can draw several conclusions from the available empirical evidence. 
First, the evidence points strongly to the existence of fiscal interdependence among 
jurisdictions. The MRA coefficients can be used to construct estimates of average interactions. 
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These are summarized in Table 7 for several countries, as well as the average for all countries 
combined. We report three sets of estimates, depending on the estimator used, IV, GMM, or 
maximum likelihood. When the average of all countries is considered, all three types of 
interactions are positive, regardless of the estimator used. The average of all countries, however, 
disguises significant country differences in fiscal interactions. For example, for Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK, expenditure (welfare) competition appears to take the form of negative 
interactions – an increase in welfare payments in one jurisdiction results in reduced welfare 
payments in another. One explanation for this lies in the presence of equalization mechanisms. In 
contrast, for the USA, Canada, France, and Germany, there are positive interactions with respect 
to horizontal expenditure competition.  Columns 4, 5, and 6 show that horizontal tax competition 
is positive in all the countries listed: A decrease in taxes in one jurisdiction induces a reduction in 
another.  In the case of vertical tax competition, the MRA shows that this is limited in Canada 
and Germany. It is significant in Sweden and the UK where the interactions are negative: An 
increase in the tax rate at a higher jurisdiction induces a reduction in tax at a lower level 
jurisdiction. In contrast, an increase in the tax rate in France and the US at a higher jurisdiction 
induces an increase in the tax rate at a lower level jurisdiction. These results are consistent with 
the lack of firm prediction on the direction of vertical competition (Wilson, 1999). These MRA 
results suggests that for France and the US, the revenue and deadweight loss effects might 
dominate the expenditure and tax substitutability and complementarity effects that arise from 
vertical interactions.40 
With the exception of Germany, spatial interactions amongst jurisdictions at a similar 
level of government appear to be larger with respect to horizontal tax competition than they are 
with respect to welfare competition.  For the UK and Sweden, vertical tax interactions tend to be 
larger in absolute terms  than horizontal tax interactions. 
                                               
40 The revenue effect occurs when increased federal taxes force lower level governments to increase their taxes in 
order to maintain their revenue. The expenditure effect occurs when lower level governments reduce their 
expenditures in response to reduced revenues. See Besley and Rosen (1998) for details on these and other effects. 
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A second finding from the MRA is that the level of aggregation appears to be important: 
Interactions differ according to level of government. Compared to the municipality level, 
horizontal tax and welfare competition are both smaller when the jurisdiction is a State. That is, 
the strategic interactions are more pronounced at the municipal and county levels, and less so at 
the State level. However, interactions at the national level are stronger than those at the State 
level. Hence, the MRA suggests that inter-jurisdictional interactions appear to be non-monotonic 
and suggests that the level of government can influence the mechanisms in place to reduce 
competition, primarily the extent of jurisdictional differentiation through regulation primarily.   
Third, in contrast to the country differences, there is no evidence of time variation in any of 
the spatial interactions. The evidence to date suggests that fiscal interactions have not been 
growing stronger nor becoming weaker over the time period analyzed. Fourth, the econometric 
strategy pursued in estimating fiscal interactions matters.  More precisely, ignoring fixed effects 
and ignoring the endogeneity of spatial interactions biases estimates. The MRA estimates 
quantify the size of this bias. 
Fifth, the MRA indicates that econometric specification matters, as it can influence the 
extent of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, the inclusion of controls for income, the tax 
base and population all affect the size of the reported strategic interactions.   Sixth, the literature 
appears to be relatively free of selection bias, except for the horizontal tax competition literature, 
which also contains the majority of the observations. 
Finally, the MRA also sheds some light on the causes of fiscal interactions. The 
institutional variables CapitalControl and VoterTurnover, enable us compare the relative strength 
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of tax competition versus yardstick competition theories. These variables are statistically 
significant in determining the degree of both horizontal tax and welfare competition. However, 
CapitalControl exerts a larger effect that does VoterTurnover. This suggests that while the 
evidence supports both theories, there is stronger support for tax competition. In addition to 
factors these, the MRA indicates that the degree of decentralization of a federation shapes the 
intensity of inter-jurisdictional interactions; it increases horizontal tax competition, but weakens 
horizontal welfare competition and vertical tax competition.  
On the basis of the evidence presented here we can confirm that governments are clearly 
interdependent. While competition among governments exists and takes multiple shapes, meta-
regression analysis shows that fiscal interactions are a significant feature of federations and 
decentralized systems of government and that they are shaped by institutional design and 
political incentives.  
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Table 1: Estimates of Inter-Jurisdictional Interactions  
Interaction: Number of 
Studies 
Number of 
Estimates 
Horizontal Tax 48 649 
Horizontal Benefits 32 349 
Vertical Tax 23 150 
Vertical Benefits 3 20 
 
Total† 
 
83 
 
1,168 
Note: † While several studies report estimates for more than one type of interaction, there are 83 independent 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Country Composition of Estimates of Inter-Jurisdictional Interactions  
Country  Number of Studies 
(Estimates) 
Country  Number of Studies 
(Estimates) 
USA  34 (354) OECD  3 (70) 
EU  3 (126) Canada  6 (65) 
UK  8 (117) Germany  2 (46) 
Sweden  7 (92) All others#  5 (41) 
Switzerland  6 (82) France  6 (13) 
# These are the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Belgium, Brazil and Spain. 
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Table 3: Institutional Data Used in the MRA 
Country Tax 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
Capital 
Controls 
Voter 
 Turnout 
USA  38.08 8.12 67.53 
Sweden  43.77 8.07 83.98 
Switzerland  55.32 9.55 45.98 
UK  13.97 8.06 69.35 
Germany  7.00 7.38 79.69 
France  18.71 7.14 65.23 
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Table 4: Meta-Regression Analysis of Horizontal Tax Competition 
(Dependent variable = partial correlations)  
Variable Mean 
(S.D.) 
(1) 
Base  
model 
(2) 
Plus 
estimators 
(3) 
Plus country 
differences 
(4) 
General 
model 
(5) 
General to 
specific 
model 
(6) 
Constant  0.28 (6.12) 0.39 (5.25) -0.92 (2.83) -0.38 (1.09) -0.67 (3.13) 
Standard error 0.05(0.03) 0.68 (0.96) -0.54 (0.79) -0.99 (1.29) -1.68 (-2.14) -1.87 (2.64) 
Data differences 
Profit tax 0.41(0.49) -0.06(1.64) -0.03 (1.03) 0.01 (0.10) -0.05 (1.67) - 
Income tax 0.13(0.33) 0.01 (0.20) -0.03 (0.75) -0.01 (0.01) -0.07 (1.43) -0.07 (1.89) 
Property tax 0.14(0.35) -0.03(1.17) -0.01 (0.52) 0.01 (0.12) -0.06 (1.50) - 
Sales tax 0.17(0.37) -0.02(0.65) 0.02 (0.59) 0.03 (1.34) -0.02 (0.60) - 
County  0.09(0.29) 0.05 (0.91) 0.10 (2.05) 0.10 (2.80) -0.03 (0.58) - 
State  0.32(0.47) 0.03 (0.57) 0.07 (1.71) -0.01 (0.27) -0.15 (2.85) -0.22 (9.41) 
Nation  0.20(0.40) 0.05 (1.15) 0.11 (2.69) 0.35 (5.46) 0.14 (2.25) 0.19 (3.31) 
Panel  0.86(0.35) -0.20(6.12) -0.23 (4.34) -0.12 (1.83) -0.07 (1.02) - 
AverageYear 0.71(7.16) 0.01 (0.87) 0.01 (1.10) 0.01 (1.27) 0.01 (0.49) - 
Estimators 
Fixed effects 0.73(0.44) - -0.05 (1.77) -0.05 (2.21) -0.05 (2.45) -0.07 (3.59) 
Time effects 0.60(0.49) - 0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (1.26) -0.01 (1.16) - 
IV 0.57(0.50) - -0.02 (0.57) -0.03 (0.67) -0.05 (1.14) - 
GMM 0.08(0.27) - 0.06 (1.01) 0.06 (1.25) 0.09 (1.93) 0.16 (6.90) 
ML 0.21(0.40) - -0.11 (2.34) -0.06 (1.70) -0.06 (1.51) - 
OtherNonOLS 0.03(0.17) - 0.01 (0.16) 0.20 (3.22) 0.30 (4.29) 0.35(10.21) 
NoWeight 0.10(0.29) - -0.02 (0.50) 0.02 (0.76) 0.04 (1.25) - 
OtherWeight 0.04(0.21) - -0.03 (2.05) -0.01 (0.96) -0.01 (0.72) - 
Country and institutional differences 
Canada 0.06(0.24) - - -0.11 (1.53) -0.02 (0.28) - 
France 0.04(0.20) - - 0.30 (3.80) 0.36 (4.73) 0.40 (7.06) 
Switzerland 0.09(0.29) - - -0.23 (2.60) -0.31 (3.93) -0.36 (6.24) 
UK 0.11(0.31) - - -0.17 (3.28) -0.10 (2.38) -0.11 (3.06) 
OECD 0.07(0.26) - - 0.06 (1.72) 0.04 (1.00) - 
AllOthers 0.29(0.45) - - -0.17 (3.28) -0.12 (2.54) -0.15 (5.08) 
CapitalControl 7.91(1.07) - - 0.10 (4.01) 0.07 (3.00) 0.08 (4.25) 
VoterTurnout 69.28(10.78) - - 0.01 (2.85) 0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (2.01) 
FiscalDecentral 31.04(15.35) - - 0.01 (3.94) 0.01 (2.71) 0.01 (5.29) 
Specification differences 
Grants 0.50(0.50) - - - -0.01 (0.29) - 
Income 0.75(0.43) - - - 0.11 (4.28) 0.09 (4.08) 
Neighborlag 0.20(0.40) - - - -0.03 (1.72) -0.03 (1.83) 
Neighborchar 0.10(0.30) - - - 0.01 (0.16) - 
Politics 0.38(0.49) - - - -0.04 (1.27) - 
Population 0.81(0.39) - - - 0.04 (1.95) 0.05 (3.23) 
Tax base 0.20(0.40) - - - -0.16 (4.62) -0.18 (8.84) 
Unemployment 0.45(0.50) - - - -0.03 (0.95) - 
Verticalcomp 0.18(0.38) - - - -0.01 (0.49) - 
Wald-joint  8.21  
[0.00] 
39.32 
 [0.00] 
149.09 
[0.00] 
260.05 
[0.00] 
73.93  
[0.00] 
Adjusted R2  0.15 0.26 0.34 0.38 0.36 
Notes: The number of observations is 649 estimates from 48 studies. Figures in bold denote statistical significance at 
least at the 5% level. Figures in brackets report absolute values of t-statistics derived using standard errors adjusted 
for data clustering, except in column 1 where they report standard deviations. Wald-joint reports the prob-value for a 
Wald test for the joint significance of all variables included in the meta-regression models. Figures in square 
brackets are prob-values. All estimates from weighted least squares using  precision as weights. 
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Table 5: Meta-Regression Analysis of Horizontal Expenditure Competition 
(Dependent variable = partial correlations)  
Variable Mean 
(S.D.) 
(1) 
Base  
model 
(2) 
Plus 
estimators 
(3) 
Plus country 
differences 
(4) 
General 
model 
(5) 
General to 
Specific 
Model 
(6) 
Constant  0.14 (1.54) 0.11 (1.12) -0.65 (1.44) -0.51 (1.99) -0.68 (3.99) 
Standard error 0.05 (0.03) 0.66 (0.45) 0.02 (0.02) 0.12 (0.10) 0.08 (0.08) - 
Data differences 
Welfare 0.38 (0.49) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.81) 0.05 (1.08) 0.01 (0.04) - 
Education 0.12 (0.33) -0.02 (0.71) -0.05 (1.69) 0.04 (1.24) 0.01 (0.13) - 
Health  0.10(0.30) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.47) 0.07 (2.30) 0.03 (1.32) 0.02 (2.27) 
Security 0.02 (0.16) -0.20 (3.70) -0.16 (2.69) -0.11 (1.96) -0.14 (3.87) -0.13 (5.50) 
Infrastructure 0.03 (0.17) -0.04 (1.96) -0.05 (1.72) -0.01 (0.87) 0.01 (0.53) - 
County  0.16 (0.37) 0.09 (0.05) 0.05 (1.06) 0.08 (1.15) 0.03 (0.69) - 
State  0.40 (0.49) -0.06 (1.17) -0.08 (1.53) -0.05 (0.86) -0.17 (2.80) -0.19 (5.06) 
Nation 0.09 (0.28) -0.10 (1.34) -0.06 (1.10) -0.16 (0.91) -0.05 (0.36) - 
Panel  0.78 (0.41) -0.04 (0.60) 0.03 (0.35) 0.09 (0.98) 0.19 (2.11) 0.22 (3.18) 
AverageYear 2.13 (6.96) -0.01 (2.33) -0.01 (3.19) -0.01 (1.60) -0.01 (1.26) - 
Estimators 
Fixed effects 0.58 (0.49) - 0.06 (2.12) 0.06 (1.17) 0.07 (1.80) 0.07 (1.87) 
Time effects 0.59 (0.49) - -0.06 (1.10) -0.06 (1.06) -0.11 (2.94) -0.12 (3.06) 
IV 0.42 (0.49) - -0.05 (1.96) -0.06 (3.02) -0.06 (2.99) -0.04 (2.22) 
GMM 0.12 (0.32) - -0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.26) -0.04 (2.18) -0.06 (3.25) 
ML 0.27 (0.44) - 0.10 (2.20) 0.11 (1.49) 0.11 (2.11) 0.14 (3.24) 
OtherNonOLS 0.07 (0.26) - -0.12 (2.29) -0.10 (1.90) -0.06 (1.78) - 
NoWeight 0.11 (0.32) - 0.07 (1.66) 0.09 (2.21) 0.07 (1.95) 0.09 (2.32) 
OtherWeight 0.34 (0.48) - 0.02 (0.99) 0.01 (0.31) -0.01 (0.19) - 
Country and institutional differences 
Sweden 0.20 (0.40) - - -0.03 (0.33) -0.39 (3.01) -0.49 (6.05) 
Switzerland 0.06 (0.23) - - -0.04 (0.23) 0.03 (0.20) - 
UK 0.08 (0.28) - - 0.34 (1.78) -0.40 (2.52) -0.51 (4.95) 
AllOthers 0.16 (0.37) - - 0.32 (1.72) -0.37 (2.01) -0.47 (4.38) 
CapitalControl 7.99 (1.18) - - 0.01 (0.55) 0.06 (2.35) 0.08 (7.15) 
VoterTurnout 70.86(11.20) - - 0.01 (1.00) 0.01 (2.92) 0.01 (4.58) 
FiscalDecentral 32.66(14.88) - - 0.01 (1.20) -0.01 (1.87) -0.01 (3.71) 
Specification differences 
Grants 0.55 (0.50) - - - 0.05 (1.11) 0.07 (2.43) 
Income 0.72 (0.45) - - - -0.19 (3.11) -0.20 (4.34) 
Neighborlag 0.11 (0.32) - - - -0.07 (2.59) -0.08 (3.50) 
Neighborchar 0.17 (0.38) - - - -0.03 (2.23) - 
Politics 0.51 (0.50) - - - 0.13 (3.31) 0.12 (4.43) 
Population 0.78 (0.42) - - - 0.09 (2.56) 0.09 (2.96) 
Unemployment 0.51 (0.50) - - - -0.11 (3.26) -0.14 (4.25) 
Verticalcomp 0.06 (0.23) - - - -0.01 (0.33) - 
Wald-joint  4.83  
[0.00] 
40.30 
 [0.00] 
125.94 
[0.00] 
10.76 
[0.00] 
191.60  
[0.00] 
Adjusted R2  0.22 0.35 0.35 0.51 0.51 
The number of observations is 349 estimates from 32 studies. Figures in bold denote statistical significance at least 
at the 5% level. Figures in brackets report absolute values of t-statistics derived using standard errors adjusted for 
data clustering, except in column 1 where they report standard deviations. Wald-joint reports the prob-value for a 
Wald test for the joint significance of all variables included in the meta-regression models. Figures in square 
brackets are prob-values. All estimates from weighted least squares using precision as weights. 
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Table 6: Meta-Regression Analysis of Vertical Tax Competition 
(Dependent variable = partial correlations) 
Variable Mean 
(S.D.) 
(1) 
Base  
model 
(2) 
Plus 
estimators 
(3) 
Plus country 
differences 
(4) 
General 
model 
(5) 
General to 
specific 
model 
(6) 
Constant  0.04 (0.94) -0.01 (0.04) 1.35 (2.90) 0.88 (1.73) 0.84(21.69) 
Standard error 0.06(0.04) 0.18 (0.11) 0.48 (0.29) 0.20 (0.12) 0.45 (0.25) - 
Data differences 
Profit tax 0.29 (0.45) -0.09 (2.41) -0.09 (2.17) -0.22 (3.35) -0.04 (0.40) - 
Sales tax 0.21 (0.41) 0.29 (3.64) 0.29 (3.83) 0.09 (1.05) 0.05 (0.53) - 
StateVertical 0.42 (0.50 -0.03(1.58) -0.03 (1.49) -0.05 (7.16) -0.05 (11.69) -0.05(10.56) 
NationVertical  0.42 (0.50 0.11 (1.45) 0.11 (1.71) 0.16 (2.59) 0.08 (1.02) - 
AverageYear 1.76 (7.56) 0.01 (3.34) 0.01 (3.49) 0.01 (0.45) 0.01 (0.69) - 
Estimators 
Fixed effects 0.68 (0.47) - 0.03 (2.66) 0.04 (2.86) 0.03 (3.84) 0.03 (3.24) 
Time effects 0.31 (0.47) - 0.03 (0.59) 0.04 (0.97) -0.01 (0.05) - 
No Weight 0.29 (0.45) - -0.01 (0.28) 0.07 (1.68) 0.05 (1.26) - 
Country and institutional differences 
Canada 0.27 (0.45) - - 0.07 (0.59) 0.02 (0.17) - 
OECD 0.04 (0.20) - - -0.84 (3.43) -0.37 (1.09) -0.19(6.53) 
CapitalControl 8.20 (1.17) - - -0.05 (1.58) -0.01 (0.24) - 
VoterTurnout 63.54(11.22) - - -0.01 (4.31) -0.01 (4.21) -0.01(21.65) 
FiscalDecentral 41.61(13.46) - - -0.01 (3.60) -0.01 (1.31) -0.01(2.33) 
Specification differences 
Politics 0.42 (0.50) - - - 0.17 (2.13) 0.21(12.24) 
Population 0.85 (0.35) - - - 0.02 (0.15) - 
Tax base 0.21 (0.41) - - - -0.04 (0.89) -0.07(2.84) 
Wald-joint  3.66  
[0.01] 
4.50 
 [0.00] 
213.52 
[0.00] 
303.68 
[0.00] 
310.09  
[0.00] 
Adjusted R2  0.54 0.55 0.70 0.75 0.74 
The number of observations is 150 estimates from 23 studies. Figures in bold denote statistical significance at least 
at the 5% level. Figures in brackets report absolute values of t-statistics derived using standard errors adjusted for 
data clustering, except in column 1 where they report standard deviations. Wald-joint reports the prob-value for a 
Wald test for the joint significance of all variables included in the meta-regression models. Figures in square 
brackets are prob-values. All estimates from weighted least squares using precision as weights. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Summary of MRA Estimates of Spatial Interactions 
 Welfare 
competition 
Horizontal tax  
competition 
Vertical tax 
 competition 
 IV GMM ML IV GMM ML IV GMM ML 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
USA 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.34 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Canada 0.04 0.02 0.22 0.26 0.42 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.05 
France 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.42 0.58 0.42 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Germany 0.46 0.44 0.64 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Sweden -0.27 -0.29 -0.09 0.24 0.40 0.24 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55 
Switzerland -0.13 -0.15 0.05 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.38 0.38 0.38 
UK -0.18 -0.20 0 0.07 0.23 0.07 -0.38 -0.38 -0.38 
Average All 
Countries 0.18 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.30 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Notes: Calculated from regression coefficients reported in column 6 of tables 4, 5, and 6. 
 43
 
Figure 1: Funnel Plot for Estimates of Horizontal Tax Competition  
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Figure 2: Funnel Plot for Estimates of Horizontal Welfare Competition 
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Figure 3: Funnel Plot for Estimates of Vertical Tax Competition 
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Figure 4: Partial Regression Plot                             Figure 5: Partial Regression Plot,  
         Effect of Capital Controls     Fiscal Decentralization 
 
-.5
0
.5
1
e(
 P
ar
tia
l |
 X
 )
-2 -1 0 1 2
e( CapitalControl | X )
coef = .08049872, (robust) se = .01893518, t = 4.25
 
-.5
0
.5
1
e(
 P
ar
tia
l |
 X
 )
-40 -20 0 20 40
e( taxrevenuedecentralization | X )
coef = .00400209, (robust) se = .00075611, t = 5.29
 
